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PARTIES 
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff, Tech-Fluid 
Services, Inc., (Tech-Fluid) and Gavilan Operating, Inc., 
(Gavilan). Gavilan is the successor in interest to Wind River 
Resources Corporation which was brought into the action pursuant 
to an Order to Show Cause. This Court has entered its Order 
designating Gavilan Operating, Inc., as the proper party. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Appeal is from the court's Conclusions of Law and Order 
dismissing Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause. The Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this Appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(i). 
The trial court entered its Order of Foreclosure ordering 
the Sheriff of Duchesne County to sell an oil well. The well was 
sold. Wind River Resources Corporation (Wind River), as an 
assignee of the debtor, redeemed from the foreclosure sale. 
Plaintiff had an Order to Show Cause issued challenging the 
redemption by Wind River. After argument and briefing the trial 
court ruled in favor of Wind River and sustained the redemption. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the bankruptcy trustee retains redemption 
rights in realtproperty that has been abandoned by the trustee? 
2. Whether Plaintiff may lawfully execute on redemption 
rights held by the debtor Paiute, as a result of a foreclosure 
and sheriff's sale of Paiute's real property? 
3. Whether Wind River was required to submit a docket of 
the judgment to redeem when there was no judgment docketed and 
Wind River was redeeming as an assignee of Paiute and not as a 
judgment debtor? 
4. Whether, in order to redeem the property, Wind River 
was required to pay the entire amount of Plaintiff's lien rather 
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than the purchase price of $4,000,00 as required by Rule 69 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
Rule 69(f)(1), (2) and (3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(f) Redemption from Sale. 
(1) Who May Redeem. Property sold subject to 
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be 
redeemed by the following persons or their successors 
in interest: (1) The judgment debtor; (2) a creditor 
having a lien by judgment or mortgage on the property 
sold, or on some share or part thereof, subsequent to 
that on which the property was sold. 
(2) Redemption—How Made. At the time of redemption 
the person seeking the same may make payment of the 
amount required to the person from whom the property is 
being redeemed, or for him to the officer who made the 
sale, or his successor in office. At the same time the 
redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from 
whom he seeks to redeem, and serve with his notice to 
the officer: (1) a cercified copy of the docket of the 
judgment under which he claims the right to redeem, or, 
if he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a 
memorandum of the record thereof certified by the 
recorder; (2) an assignment properly acknowledged or 
proved, where the same is necessary to establish his 
claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his agent showing 
the amount then actually due on the lien. 
(3) Time for Redemption, Amount to be Paid. The 
property may be redeemed from the purchaser within six 
months after the sale on paying the amount of his 
purchase with 6 per cent thereon in addition, together 
with the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any 
reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary 
maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon 
the property which the purchaser may have paid thereon 
after the purchase, vvith interest on such amounts, and, 
if the purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior 
to that of the person seeking redemption, other than 
the judgment under which said purchase was made, the 
amount of such lien, with interest. 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was an action to foreclose a $69,708.00 mechanics 
lien on an oil and gas well. The trial court entered its order 
foreclosing Plaintiff, Tech-Fluid's, mechanics lien and directing 
the Sheriff of Duchesne County to sell the well. The Sheriff's 
Sale was held July 2, 1987. Plaintiff bid $4,000.00 and became 
the purchaser of the well at the sale. Wind River Resources 
Corporation as the assignee of Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation, 
the owner of the well, redeemed the property from the sale. 
Plaintiff then applied for and obtained from the court an Order 
to Show Cause which was served upon Wind River challenging the 
redemption and requesting that an Order enter that the redemption 
by Wind River was invalid and that Plaintiff owned the well. 
After argument, the court upheld the redemption and ruled that 
Wind River was the owner of the well. This is Plaintiff's appeal 
from that Order. 
There was no evidentiary hearing on the Order to Show Cause 
on the issues raised on appeal. The facts were stipulated by the 
parties or set forth in the pleadings. Wind River set forth in 
its Memorandum the facts it claimed were relevant and undisputed. 
(R.547-549) Plaintiff, in its Reply Memorandum, agreed with the 
statement of facts. (R.480) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation (Paiute) was the owner of 
an oil and gas well known as Paiute-Walker 13-ND1 located in 
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Duchesne County, Utah. Plaintiff claims to have provided 
services and materials to the well for which it was not paid. In 
November, 1984, Plaintiff filed a mechanics lien on the well 
property claiming it was owed $69,708.00. When the claim was not 
paid Plaintiff instituted this action to foreclose the lien. 
(R.l) On December 18, 1985, Paiute filed a Petition for 
Bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Utah. (R.157) On May 18, 1987, Plaintiff obtained an Order 
terminating the Automatic Stay and ordering the trustee to 
abandon its interest in well 13-ND1. (R.427) Plaintiff then 
immediately obtained from the District Court, an Order directing 
the Sheriff of Duchesne County to post notice and conduct a 
public sale of the well property. (R.426, 435) The foreclosure-
sale was held on July 2, 1987. L.A. Dever, counsel for JcK. 
Foster, entered a bid of $4,000.00 as a credit bid in favor of 
Plaintiff. (R.443-444) 
Paiute let it be known that its redemption rights were for 
sale. Plaintiff demanded a Quitclaim Deed from Paiute which 
Paiute refused to give. (Stipulated Fact No. 7, R.548) Plaintiff 
obtained from the County Clerk a Writ of Execution dated December 
10, 1987. The Writ instructed the Sheriff of Duchesne County to 
execute on Paiute's redemption rights. (R.446) That Writ was not 
served on Paiute but only posted on the well. (R.448, Stipulated 
Fact No. 9, R.549) The Sheriff scheduled the Sheriff's Sale 
under the Writ for January 5, 1988. (R.449) 
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On December 31, 1987, Paiute assigned to Wind River 
Resources Corporation its redemption rights on the property 
involved. (R.462, Addendum No. 1) On January 1, 1988, Wind 
River Resources Corporation delivered to the Sheriff's office of 
Duchesne County a copy of the Assignment of Rights of Redemption, 
an acknowledged Notice of Redemption (Addendum No. 2) setting 
forth the calculation of the redemption price, the property to be 
redeemed and the basis for its right to redeem, (R.4 63) and a 
cashier's check in the amount of $4,310.00. (R.457) The Sheriff 
issued a Sheriff's Redemption Certificate to Wind River. (R.465) 
On January 5, 1988, Plaintiff, through its attorney Robert 
McRae, appeared at the Courthouse for the Sheriff's Sale pursuant 
to the Writ of Execution issued against Paiute's redemption 
rights. The Sheriff continued the sale to January 6, 1988 
because of his uncertainty as to whether he should proceed with 
the sale. On January 6, 1988 Mr. McRae on behalf of Plaintiff 
again appeared. The Duchesne County Attorney objected to the 
sale proceeding. Plaintiff, however, insisted upon entering a 
bid of $89,000.00 for the redemption rights. (R.457) The 
$89,000.00 was apparently the balance Plaintiff claimed owing for 
its lien of $69,708.00 accrued interest, costs and attorney fees. 
Plaintiff then had an Order to Show Cause issued requiring 
Wind River to appear before the court in Duchesne, Utah on the 
19th day of January, 1988 to show cause, if any, why a Sheriff's 
Deed should not issue to the Plaintiff, why the Assignment of the 
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Redemption Rights from Paiute to Wind River should not be found 
null and void, or alternatively why the Sheriff of Duchesne 
County should not issue a Sheriff's Certificate as a result of 
Plaintiff's claimed sale of January 6, 1988. (R.474) 
The parties appeared before the court on January 19, 1988. 
Both parties argued their positions and submitted legal 
memoranda. The court then entered its ruling denying the Order 
to Show Cause and concluding that Plaintiff had no right, title 
or interest in the subject well. (R.569, Addendum No. 4) 
On February 10, 1988, Plaintiff filed a motion claiming that 
Wind River Resources Corporation was required to pay the entire 
amount of Plaintiff's lien of $89,000.00 to properly redeem, 
That motion was denied by the court on February 29, 1988. (R.611) 
The court then signed its Conclusions of Law and Order. (R.612, 
616, Addenda No. 5, 6 and 7) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The bankruptcy trustee's abandonment of the oil well 
returned all right and title in the well to Paiute. The trustee 
had no further interest in the well. Once abandoned by the 
trustee the well is treated as though there had been no 
bankruptcy filed. Paiute, therefore, owned all interest in the 
well including the redemption rights. Paiute was entitled to 
sell its redemption rights without further involvement of the 
trustee or the bankruptcy court. 
2. Redemption rights are given to a debtor to protect it 
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from creditors who execute on property and fail to bid the fair 
market value of the property at the Sheriff's Sale. In this case 
Plaintiff bid $4,000.00 instead of the amount of its lien. 
Plaintiff then tried to defeat Paiute's right to protect itself 
from this bargain sale by trying to take away Paiute's redemption 
rights by executing on them. The courts have consistently held 
that redemption rights are not subject to execution. Otherwise 
there would be no protection for debtors when creditors such as 
Plaintiff attempt to acquire the debtor's property for an unfair 
or nominal amount. 
3. Wind River fully complied with Rule 69(f) when it 
redeemed the property. Wind River had no duty to furnish a 
docket of the judgment under which it redeemed for two reasons. 
One reason was that there was no judgment docketed in this case. 
The second reason is that Wind River was redeeming as an assignee 
of the original debtor. Wind River was not redeeming pursuant to 
any judgment. 
4. The redemption price is determined by Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 69(f)3. Rule 69(f)3 required Wind River to pay 
the price Plaintiff paid at the foreclosure sale which was 
$4,000.00, together with interest at 6% and any necessary costs 
paid by Plaintiff to maintain the property. That was the amount 
paid by Wind River. Wind River was not required by Rule 69 to 
pay the entire amount Plaintiff claims Paiute owed on the lien. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE ABANDONED THE OIL 
WELL PROPERTY IN THIS CASE, IT ALSO ABANDONED TO PAIUTE 
THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY AFTER PLAINTIFF'S LIEN 
FORECLOSURE SALE. 
After the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, Paiute, the owner of 
the well, filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Utah. Plaintiff then proceeded in the 
Bankruptcy Court and obtained an Order from the Bankruptcy Court 
terminating the Automatic Stay and the trustee was ordered to 
abandon the estate's interest in Well ND13-1. (R.427) Plaintiff 
then proceeded with its foreclosure action in State court. 
Plaintiff now argues that even though the trustee abandoned all 
its interest: 5 v. did not abandon the redemption rights. That 
argument is not supported by the law. 
The law is that when the bankruptcy trustee abandons 
property the trustee has no further interest in that property and 
the property is treated as though there had been no bankruptcy 
filed. In re: Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581 (Utah 1981) , In re: 
Tarpley, 4 B.R. 145 (Tenn. 1980). In In re: Cruseturner, supra, 
the issues involved redemption rights of personal property which 
had been abandoned. The Court stated: 
When the trustee abandons property, the property stands 
as if no bankruptcy had been filed and the debtor 
enjoys the same claim to it and interest in it as he 
held previous to the filing of bankruptcy. 8 B.R. 581 
at 591. 
In the matter of Sanders Tool Supply, Inc., 73 B.R. 55 
(Bankruptcy Md. Fl. 1987) the trustee attempted to challenge a 
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deficiency claim arising from abandoned property because the 
trustee did not receive notice of the foreclosure sale on the 
abandoned property. The court held that the trustee was not 
entitled to notice. It said: 
The effect of the abandonment is to cast out the 
property which was formerly the property of the estate. 
If this occurs, it operates as a relinquishment of all 
rights by the trustee in the abandoned property. 
(Emphasis added) 
Id at 57. In In re: Tarpley. 4 B.R. 145 (Tenn. 1980) the trustee 
attempted to bring back into the estate property it had 
abandoned. The court in refusing to allow the trustee to reclaim 
the abandoned property said: 
Once abandoned, title to such property revests in the 
bankrupt as of the date of commencement of the 
bankruptcy proceedings. Liens encumbering the property 
are not affected in any way by the abandonment and the 
debtor holds title in the same way as prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy. 4 B.R. at 14 6 
See also In re: Polumbo, 271 F. Supp. 640 (WD. Va. 1967), Mason 
vs. C.I.R., 646 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1980). 
Plaintiff argues that somehow the right of redemption has no 
tie to real property being foreclosed and therefore an 
abandonment of all the trustee's interest in the real property is 
not an abandonment of the redemption rights. Such is not the law 
and none of the Plaintiff's cases stand for that proposition. 
Rule 69(f)(1) defines who has the right to redeem, ie. , the 
debtor, successor in interest to the debtor, junior lienholders 
and judgment creditors. All those individuals have an interest 
in the foreclosed real property. The purpose of redemption is to 
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protect those who have an interest in the foreclosed property. 
First National Bank vs. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57 P.2d 1401 
(1936). 
The cases Plaintiff cites for its argument that redemption 
rights are an asset of the bankruptcy estate are cases where the 
bankruptcy estate also held the property being foreclosed and 
therefore, the trustee was a successor in interest to the debtor. 
Plaintiff has not cited a case where the bankruptcy trustee 
abandoned the property and then was allowed to redeem and recover 
the property. Once the property is abandoned there can be no 
recovery of that property by the bankruptcy court. In re: 
Tarpley. supra. 
The undisputed facts in this case are that the trustee 
abandoned its interest in the well in question. (Addendum 3) 
That abandonment was at the request of Plaintiff. Once that 
abandonment occurred, Paiute owned all interest in the well, 
including redemption rights, and the well was treated as though 
no bankruptcy had been filed. Since Paiute was the owner of all 
interest in the well, including the redemption rights, the 
bankruptcy court had no further interest in the oil well. Paiute 
was entitled to redeem or to assign its redemption rights 
pursuant to Rule 69. The assignment for valuable consideration 
of those rights to Wind River was proper, was in accordance with 
Rule 69 and did not require any action by the bankruptcy court or 
the bankruptcy trustee. 
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POINT II. PLAINTIFF MAY NOT DEPRIVE THE DEBTOR OF ITS 
RIGHT TO REDEEM ITS PROPERTY AFTER A FORECLOSURE SALE 
BY EXECUTION AND SALE OF THE REDEMPTION RIGHT AT A 
SEPARATE SALE. 
The purpose of redemption is to protect the debtor from a 
creditor who tries to realize a substantial profit by bidding 
less than fair value for the property at the foreclosure sale. 
First National Bank vs. Havmond, 18 Utah 151, 159, 57 P.2d 1401, 
1405 (1936), U.S. vs. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1975). 
The courts have therefore ruled that a creditor cannot execute on 
a party's redemption rights as that would defeat that protection 
given to the debtor. Johnson vs. Zahn, 44 N.E.2d 15 (111. 1942), 
42 ALR 885, 57 ALR 1128 and 30 AmJur.2d Executions, §172. 
In United States vs. MacKenzie, supra, the 9th Circuit 
reversed the trial court and held that the debtor was entitled to 
redemption rights following a foreclosure by SBA. The court 
said: 
The underlying purpose of both the Nevada and Arizona 
statutes is to prevent the injustice that occurs when a 
debtor's property is sold on foreclosure sale for a 
price significantly less than its fair market 
value The Arizona device is to secure to the debtor 
redemption rights and thus pose an economic threat to 
prospective purchasers, including a creditor that an 
artificially low bid can be defeated by redemption. 
Id. at 41. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois, under facts virtually 
identical to those in this case, held that the right of 
redemption was not subject to a lien originating from a 
deficiency judgment obtained by the creditor purchasing at the 
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Sheriff's Sale. In so holding, the court observed the unfair 
position to which the assignee of the right of redemption would 
be placed if the creditor/purchaser were allowed a lien on the 
equity of redemption: 
It is apparent that if...the deficiency judgment 
attaches as a lien to the equity of redemption, then a 
judgment creditor who redeems after (the statutory 
redemption period) has expired, must take the property 
burdened with the lien of the deficiency judgment, and 
this even though the judgment is a personal one against 
the mortgagor who has lost all interest whatever in the 
property. Johnson vs. Zahn, 44 NE.2d 15, 19 (111. 
1949) 
Allowing execution on the right of redemption also raises 
the specter of the judgment debtor or his assignee redeeming from 
the sale of the redemption rights only to have it executed upon 
again with the potential for the same process to be-repeated ever 
and over. That procedure was not contemplated by Rule 69 which 
provides for an ending point on foreclosures. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Evans vs. Humphries, 5 P.2d 545 (Id. 
1931) is misplaced. The facts in that case are** substantially 
different from those in this case. In that case there were two 
different creditors and two different judgments. Both creditors 
executed on the same property. The issue was the effect of two 
executions on the same property. No such situation exists in the 
case before this court. Finally, it should be noted that at no 
time has Plaintiff requested the court to enter a deficiency 
judgment. Since no deficiency judgment has entered and since the 
mechanics lien had been foreclosed, Plaintiff had no basis under 
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Rule 69 to have a Writ of Execution issued to execute on the 
redemption rights. 
POINT III. WIND RIVER'S REDEMPTION OF THE OIL WELL 
PROPERTY IN THIS CASE COMPLIED WITH THE PROCEDURAL 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 69(f)(2). 
Plaintiff's claim that Wind River's redemption was 
ineffective for failure to comply with Rule 69(f)(2) is wrong. 
The facts show that the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) were met. 
Wind River received the written Assignment of Redemption 
Rights from Paiute on December 31, 1987. (R.561) On December 29, 
1987, Thomas Bachtell, President of Wind River, contacted the 
Duchesne County Sheriff's office, informed the Sheriff that he 
was acquiring an Assignment of the Redemption Rights and obtained 
from the Sheriff the amount necessary to redeem. Mr. Bachtell 
also made arrangements to meet at the Duchesne County Sheriff's 
office to make the redemption. (R.565) On January 1, 1988, Mr. 
Bachtell went to the Duchesne County Sheriff's office and 
delivered a cashier's check in the amount of $4,310.00, which 
included the purchase price of $4,000.00, interest of $240.00 and 
costs of $70.00. A copy of the properly acknowledged Assignment 
of the Redeirxrcion Rights and a notarized document entitled 
"Notice of Redemption11 which set forth the calculation of the 
purchase price, the property that was being redeemed and the 
basis upon which Wind River was redeeming were delivered to the 
Sheriff. (Addenda 1 and 2) In return for those documents the 
Sheriff delivered to Mr. Bachtell a Sheriff's Redemption 
Certificate. (R.459-4 65) 
Rule 69(f)(2) provides that at the time of redemption the 
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party seeking redemption must tender the redemption price and: 
(1) a certified copy of the docket of the judgment 
under which he claims the right to redeem, or, if he 
redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of 
the record thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an 
assignment properly acknowledged or proved where the 
same is necessary to establish his claim; (3) an 
affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount 
then actually due on the lien. 
Wind River delivered to the Sheriff the correct redemption price 
of $4,310.00. It also delivered to the Sheriff the Assignment of 
Redemption Rights and an' affidavit which was entitled "Notice of 
Redemption" setting forth the calculation of the redemption price 
and other information regarding the redemption. Plaintiff's 
argument has been that Wind River has failed to produce a 
certified copy *of ' th£ * doc)?&t/ of the judgment or memorandum of 
Wind River's mortgage or other lien as required by Rule 
69(f)2(1). Wind River was not redeeming under a mortgage or a 
lien so those documents do not exist. Furthermore, no judgment 
had ever been prepared and signed and docketed in this case, 
therefore, such could not be produced. The requirement of 
producing a certified copy of the docket of the judgment also is 
not applicable to Wind River. Wind River was redeeming as a 
successor in interest of the debtor. Wind River was not 
redeeming as a creditor having a judgment lien or mortgage on the 
property. See Rule 69(f)(1). 
Even if the court were to determine that there was some 
deviation from the procedure set forth in Rule 69(f)(2) such 
would not invalidate the redemption. In United States vs. 
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Loosely, 551 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1976) the redeeming party deviated 
substantially from the provisions of Rule 69(f)(2). The court in 
finding the redemption valid stated: 
[I]f a debtor, acting in good faith, has substantially 
complied with the procedural requirements of the rule 
in such a manner that the lender mortgagee is not 
injured or adversely affected, and is getting what he 
is entitled to, the law will not aid in depriving the 
mortgagor of his property for mere falling short of 
exact compliance with technicalities. 
Id. at 508. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish United States vs. 
Loosely oy arguing that Mollerup vs. Storage Systems 
International, 569 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1977) requires that the right 
of redemption be exercised in strict accord with statutory terms. 
ln:o€ t: JO CI ses are not inconsistent but actuc liy- sta^e tv»o 
difreirent ru" es of construction. &s pointed out 'j~i Household 
Finance Corporation vs. Bacon, 648 P.2d 421 (Ore. 1982); 
"although the right to redeem is strictly construed and 
must be pursued in accordance with the applicable 
statutes, redemption statutes are remedial and are to 
be liberally construed". 648 P.2d at 421. 
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POINT IV. WIND RIVER PAID THE SHERIFF THE CORRECT 
AMOUNT WHEN IT REDEEMED THE OIL WELL PROPERTY FROM THE 
SHERIFF'S FORECLOSURE SALE. 
Wind River, at the time it redeemed the property, paid the 
purchase price of $4,000.00, interest at the rate of 6 per cent 
and costs as required by Rule 69(f)(3). Plaintiff now asserts 
that Wind River should have paid to the Sheriff the entire amount 
of the debt for which the mechanics lien was filed. To 
illustrate the error of Plaintiff's claim, one only needs to 
apply the names of the parties to the statutory provision in 
question and it becomes clear that the provision relied on by 
Plaintiff has no application in this case. The provision in 
question states: 
[I]f the purchaser (Plaintiff) is also a creditor 
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking 
redemption (Wind River) other than the judgment under 
which said purchase was made, the amount of such lien 
with interest. 
In this case, Wind River Resources does not have a lien on the 
property "prior to that of the person seeking redemption" nor 
does Plaintiff. The property was redeemed by Wind River as an 
assignee of Paiute. Plaintiff does not have another lien on the 
property in addition to the one that has been foreclosed. This 
particular provision Rule 69(f)(3) has no application to the 
facts of this case. It is to be applied in cases in which there 
are numerous liens on the property by both the redeeming party 
and the purchaser. 
Plaintiff set the redemption price when it bid $4,000.00 at 
17 
the foreclosure sale. If Plaintiff considers the property worth 
more than the $4,000.00 it bid, it should have bid the fair price 
at the sale. Instead, it attempted to secure a windfall for 
itself by bidding an unreasonably low amount so as not to satisfy 
most of the debt for which the lien was filed, with the prospect 
that it could take the well and still not extinguish the debt. 
Plaintiff cites cases from a few other jurisdictions for the 
proposition that Plaintiff's lien, rather than the redemption 
price, should have been the amount paid by Wind River. Those 
cases are contrary to the express provisions of Rule 69(f)(3) 
which governs the purchase price in this case. Madsen, Equitable 
Consideration of Mortgage Foreclosure and Redemption in Utah: A 
Mend for Remedial Legislation, 1976 Utah L.Rev. 327, 343 (1976). 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff foreclosed on the oil well property in question 
and bid $4,000.00 at the foreclosure sale. Plaintiff had buyer's 
regret when it learned that other parties were interested in the 
well and valued the well at more than $4,000.00 and exercised the 
statutory right to redeem. Plaintiff has resorted to convoluted 
readings of Rule 69 in its attempt to acquire the well at the low 
price that it bid. The trial court properly ruled that the 
redemption by Wind River was proper and that Plaintiff having 
received the redemption price has no further interest in the 
well. 
It is respectfully requested that the trial court's decision 
be affirmed. 
DATED this<*?y day of August, 1988. 
NIELSEN" i SENIOR 
Attorij/ey/s yfor Gavilan Operating, 
Inc. 
By: /^^J.^Th^carM?^ 
Gayle/F. McKeachnfe ^d. 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
hereby 
a Utah 
in the 
redeem 
pursuan 
Service 
85-CV-l 
County, 
hereby 
redeem 
Oil & M 
ASSIGNMENT OF REDEMPTION RIGHTS 
Paiute Oil &^i^^|^^9^P31E^tion' a Utah corporation, 
assigns and conveys* to Winci River Resources Corporation/ 
corporation/ all of Paiute's right, title and interest 
property described below, plus all of Paiute's right to 
said property from the sale held on July 2, 1987 
t to an execution issued in the case of Tech-Fluid 
s, Inc. vs. Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., Civil No. 
3D in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne 
State of Utah. Wind River Resources Corporation is 
authorized to take any and all actions necessary to 
said property on its own behalf in the stead of Paiute 
ining Corporation. 
The property to be redeemed is described as follows: 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township 
3 South, Range 5 Westf^uuchesne County, 
Utah, together with all rights, privi-
leges, franchise, easements, equipment, 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
EXECUTED the i w /f£_ day of U&±*!/*\/j£^ , 198T . 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORPORATION 
By : Lhl/f/ CAs 
D,. r£CA~(?^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the I&+ day of r j y ^ ^ ^ , 198£_, personally 
appeared before me, (J^ crS^  k^ib^jQ/ who, being by me duly 
sworn/ did say, that he is <fc&a / l ^ ^ T ^ ) / ^ of Paiute Oil & 
Mining Corporation, and that this instrument was signed in 
behalf of .said corporation by authority of its bylaws, and said 
acknowledged to ->,me that said 
corporation executed the sar 
My/Commission Expires: 
btetfary Publico j . \ 
EXHIBIT A 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
NOTICE OF REDEMPTION 
TO: The Sheriff of Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on this date, Wind River 
Resources Corporation, a Utah corporation, redeemed the fol-
lowing property from your sale thereof to Tech-Fluid Services, 
Inc. on July 2, 1987 pursuant to an execution on a judgment 
rendered in the case of Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. vs. Paiute 
3il & Mining Corp., et al, Civil Case No. 85-CV-13D in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State of 
Jtah. The certificate of sale shows a purchase price of 
?4,000. This amount plus interest of $240 and posting costs of 
?70, for a total of $4,310 is hereby tendered to you in 
accordance with Rule 69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The property redeemed is described as follows: 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND~1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township 
3 South, Range 5 West/^Duchesne County, 
Utah, together with all rights, privi-
leges, franchise, easements, equipment, 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
Wind River Resources Corporation claims the right to 
redeem the above property on the basis that it has received an 
assignment from the judgment debtor of the judgment debtor's 
redemption rights so that Wind River Resources Corporation is 
the successor in interest of the judgment debtor for purposes 
Df redemption in accordance with Rule 69(f)(1) of the Utah 
*ules of Civil Procedure. Attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference is an assignment of said redemption rights from the 
judgment debtor. 
/ IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Notice is executed on 
^AOI<^^ _ ) , 198£- . 
x i _ 
WIND RIVER RESOURCES CORPORATION 
By; 
04'JO 
- 2 -
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
/ day of HrLAU^N , 198J?, personally 
T^^\V\CN\TB^y ,^ /riho, being by me duly 
it he is the PgFS'ftfc^T of Wind River 
Lon, and that the attached Notice of Redemp-
led in b^^lfvpf said corporation by authority of 
nd said \ H^lJ^lvV.Vn^^C. acknowledged to me 
that said corporation executed the same. 
On the 
appeared before me 
sworn, did say, that 
Resources Corporation 
tion was sign
its bylaws, a 
VAA 
Notary Publi 
Residing a 
i¥S J 1 — 
My Commission Expires: 
0-lo<, 
ADDENDUM NO. 3 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Harriet E. Styler, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am the bankruptcy trustee for the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah in In re Paiute Oil 
and Mining Corporation, Bankruptcy No. 84C-02620. 
2. On May 18, 1987, the Bankruptcy Court entered an 
Order Granting Relief from Automatic Stay and Abandonment, 
wherein I was ordered to abandon the bankrupt's interest in 
Well ND 13-1. 
3. Pursuant to this Order, I abandoned all right, 
title, and interest in Well ND 13-1, including the statutory 
right of redemption under Rule 69(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
4. It was and is my intent that the debtor be free 
to exercise any and all rights of redemption in connection with 
Well ND 13-1, including retention of the proceeds of any 
assignment of its redemption rights. 
DATED this O "^ day of January, 1988. 
Ha rriet E. Styler^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this *' day of 
January, 1988. 
My Ccnunission Expires: 
" / ^ ft 7 
2110rn 
NJM 
'/"^ A /\ /./ /.- Uy'lUf] 
NOTARY PUBLIC-, >, 1 JT~ /" ~ 
Residing at: \ s , i X I A^fc ^J.J^j.^M , 
Ltt^L 
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ADDENDUM NO, 4 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICE, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY 
GROUP, CHEVRON USA, INC., and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body 
politic, 
Defendants. 
R U L I N G 
C i v i l No. 35-CV-13D 
The court, having fully considered the arguments and memoranda 
of counsel, and having reviewed the cited cases, rules as follows: 
1) The assignment of redemption rights to Wind River was 
valid. The trustee in bankruptcy abandoned the subject property 
long before there were any redemption rights. The bankruptcy 
estate did not have any interest in those rights whatsoever. 
2) Rights of redemption are not property which can be 
executed upon. To allow such an action would destroy any pro-
tection provided by the statutes which created redemption rights. 
3} Wind River's redemption was in substantial compliance 
tfith Rule 69; Plaintiff received everything to which it was entitled 
mder that rule, and has not shown that it was prejudiced by the 
find failure to provide the copy of the judgment docket, which, in 
fact, did not exist. 
s ^ 
Therefore, this court orders that all right, title and interest 
of Defendant Paiute in the subject well be vested in Wind River 
Resources Corporation, and that Plaintiff have no further interest 
therein. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Clark B. Allred 
Harry H. Scuvall 
^^j^^^^° c^^^i^^^c^ 
ADDENDUM NO. 5 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Wind River 
Resources Corporation 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICE, INC., ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., ] 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY ] 
GROUP, CHEVRON USA, INC., 
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body ] 
politic, 
Defendants. 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 87-CV-13D 
The above captioned matter came before the Court January 19, 
1988, pursuant to Tech-Fluid Services, Inc.'s, (Tech-Fluid) Order 
to Show Cause. Tech-Fluid was represented by its attorneys, 
Harry Souvall and L.A. Dever. Wind River Resources Corporation 
(Wind River) was represented by its attorney, Clark B. Allred. 
The principal issue presented by the Order to Show Cause was 
whether Tech-Fluid or Wind River had acquired Paiute Oil & Mining 
Corporation's (Paiute) interest in a certain oil and gas well, 
Tech-Fluid advanced three arguments claiming that the Trustee in 
Bankruptcy, not Paiute, was the holder of the redemption rights; 
that Tech-Fluid had executed on the redemption rights and that 
.r 
iA^v:cr 
"I VAtfc 
?^-//V 
Wind River had failed to comply with Rule 69 when it redeemed the 
property. The facts upon which the Court was to decide these 
issues was stipulated to, at oral argument and then listed in 
Wind River's Memorandum. The Court having heard argument on 
January 19, 1988; the parties having submitted Memoranda on the 
three issues advanced by Tech-Fluids and the Court being fully 
advised, enters the following Conclusions of Law. 
1. The Trustee in the Paiute bankruptcy abandoned the 
subject property long before there were any redemption rights and 
that abandonment included the abandonment of any redemption 
rights. The bankruptcy estate did not have any interest in those 
redemption rights and therefore, the assignment of the redemption 
rights to Wind River was valid. 
2. Redemption rights are not property which can be 
executed upon. To allow such an action would destroy any 
protection provided by the statutes which created redemption 
rights and the policies and purposes of redemption rights. 
Therefore, Tech-Fluid's attempt to execute on the redemption 
rights was of no effect. 
3. Wind River's redemption was in substantial compliance 
with Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Tech-Fluid 
received everything to which it was entitled and has not shown 
that it was prejudiced by Wind River's failure to provide a copy 
of the judgment docket, particularly where, in this case, there 
2 
was no judgment docketed. 
DATED this^Mday of February, 1988. 
Dennis L. Draney / 
District Judge U 
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ADDENDUM NO. 6 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. MCKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Wind River 
Resources Corporation 
3 63 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICE, INC., ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY ] 
GROUP, CHEVRON USA, INC., ] 
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body 
politic, 
Defendants. 
1 ORDER 
I Civil No. 87-CV-13D 
The above captioned matter having come before the Court on 
January 19, 1988, pursuant to Tech-Fluid's Order to Show Cause. 
The parties having stipulated to the facts and the Court having 
entered its Conclusions of Law; the Court hereby; 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. Tech-Fluid Service, Inc.'s, Order to Show Cause is 
hereby dismissed. 
2. All right, title and interest of Defendant, Paiute Oil 
& Mining Corporation, in the subject well, which well is known as 
No. 13-ND-l is vested in Wind River Resources Corporation and 
n 
• i/.C;'k 
Tech-Fluid Service, Inc., has no interest in said property 
DATED thisc^^day of Febru^y, 1988. 
¥<?ZC^C~3 
Dennis L. Draney ~7~ 
District Judge (J 
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ADDENDUM NO. 7 
CLARK B. ALLRED - 0055 
GAYLE F. McKEACHNIE - 2200 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Wind River 
Resources Corporation 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICE, INC., ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., ] 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY ] 
GROUP, CHEVRON USA, INC., 
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body ; 
politic,
 t 
Defendants. ] 
ORDER 
\ Civil No. 87-CV-13D 
The above captioned matter came before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Ruling, Plaintiff's Motion 
dated February 10, 1988, and Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed 
Conclusions of Law and Order. The Court having reviewed the 
Motions and Memoranda, filed by the parties, hereby finds that 
the Court has already ruled on the sufficiency of compliance with 
Rule 69. The Court further finds that the redeeming party need 
not pay the balance due on the lien. The lien of the Plaintiff 
has been extinguished. The Plaintiff, when it had its 
foreclosure, had the opportunity to bid a sufficient amount to 
protect its interest. The Court furthermore, finds that 
Plaintiff's interpretation of Rule 69 is not correct, but rather 
the interpretation propounded by Wind River is proper. Based on 
these findings the Court hereby enters the following Order: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Ruling and 
Plaintiff's Motion dated February 10, 1988 are hereby denied. 
2. The parties, at oral argument, stipulated to the facts, 
which stipulated facts are also set forth in the Memoranda. The 
Court, therefore, denies Plaintiff's objections and has signed 
the Conclusions of Law and Order submitted by Wind River. 
DATED this C"A day of March, 1988. 
(y^^t^yt^o c>Z!lr (L 
Dennis L. Draney 
District Judge 
2 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
Shelly Massey, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of NIELSEN & SENIOR, 
Clark B. Allred, attorneys for Wind River Resources Corporation, 
herein; that she served the attached ORDER upon counsel by 
placing a true and correct copy thereon in an envelope addressed 
to: 
Mr. Harry H. Souvall 
McRAE & DeLAND 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Vernal, Utah, on the y ^ 
day of March, 1988. 
feity M a s f e e y / W 
1988. 
She~l y Ma^sey /  n 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^j_ day of March, 
/ 
My commission expires: Ndtary Public 
C1 / .s\ /->-•} Residing at Vernal, Utah 
^ li;i<m 
. x6 (\ ^ S 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Gavilan Operating, Inc.^ postage prepaid and 
addressed to Harry H. Souvall and Robert M. McRae, McRAE & 
DeLAND, 209 East 100 North, Vernal, Utaly,8Jiyj8, this ?T day of 
August, 1988. ^ 
Clark B. \Allred 
